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FOREWORD
MICAH THORNER*

As a prospective law student, I found the focus of this "Law &"
Symposium to be a captivating and thought-provoking introduction to
many of the issues I hope to come across in my legal career. The
papers presented here cover an impressive range of interdisciplinary
scholarship and incorporate both obscure and well-known applications of non-legal concepts to the study and practice of law. The
perspectives provided by philosophical, linguistic, biological, psychological, and religious areas of study provide significant insights for
solving legal problems. The interdisciplinary focus of this symposium
not only demonstrates the extent to which law is influenced by other
fields, but it also illustrates how these disciplines are shaped by the
very law they affect. While legal scholarship is undoubtedly enhanced
by the contributions of other disciplines, it becomes apparent from
the work presented here that there also are many challenges associated with taking such an interdisciplinary approach.
Laws outline our rights and duties, and provide a means for seeking justice and maintaining order. These rights and duties cannot be
fully defined, debated, and understood by merely examining legal
doctrines alone; rather, a truly effective legal approach ought to
account for the wisdom of other disciplines, thereby both better addressing underlying social concerns and exploiting methodologies that
can help develop more innovative public policy. As University of
Chicago professor Douglas G. Baird points out, "other disciplines
give us the tool kit to understand how the law works in our world."1
Modern and effective legal instruments must therefore emphasize the
relationship between legal institutions and people, social conditions,
and ideas. Professor Baird concludes, "We can understand the law
* Micah Thorner is beginning her law school career at Georgetown University Law
Center in the fall of 2004. She currently works as a legal assistant to several members of the
Georgetown Law faculty. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable guidance and
support provided by Claire A. Hill and the helpful advice of Emile Karafiol.
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only if we understand both how it affects the behavior of the society it
governs and how it reflects the values its citizens have. For this reason, one cannot study law as if it were a self-contained world unto
itself."'2 An interdisciplinary approach to law not only provides additional perspectives on multifaceted social concerns and broadens
one's understanding of relevant non-legal factors, it also reveals the
potential limitations of legal reasoning.
The "Law &" Symposium provided numerous such examples.
The articles presented highlight the importance of interdisciplinary
work within a legal context, yet also illustrate the challenges that
come from incorporating the principles and theories of ancillary fields
in the analysis, formulation, and administration of legal concepts. The
administration of justice depends on the guidance of diverse theoretical perspectives that are necessary for providing a broader social context in which to consider legal issues. As the papers here suggest, a
disregard of interdisciplinary applications could lead to misguided,
inefficient, and obsolete legal theory and policy. Almost every aspect
of modern law depends on precepts developed by other areas of study
to ensure thorough analysis of public policy.
Law is ill-equipped to determine the impact of latent and explicit
prejudices, evaluate the efficacy of policies and punishments, examine
substantive differences in linguistic strategy, or predict the behavior
of rational actors on its own. It must look to the contributions of
other fields in order to develop and maintain effective and topical
means for protecting rights and preserving order.
Efficient and advantageous integration of other disciplines and
the law can, however, prove quite difficult. A policy debate, for example, based on the findings of psychological and sociological research, would not only require an understanding of relevant social
science data, but the issue would also be shaped by prevailing legal
factors such as current legislation, government rules, political theories, and legislative processes that could potentially affect or be
affected by the conclusions drawn from such findings.
The articles in this Symposium reflect on many such difficulties
encountered with the various interdisciplinary approaches to the law,
and reveal complexities of the law that are often fascinating yet challenging to overcome. Many of the questions examined by the Symposium's contributors, therefore, provide illustrations of how ventures
2. Id.
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into other fields can pose obstacles to legal research, practice, and
scholarship. Such problems ranged from reconciling the findings of
widely disparate research techniques to finding the best policy solution in light of unpopular rationales.
The purpose of law is to regulate the use of power, define standards of acceptable conduct, and provide the means for achieving
social objectives. Language is therefore instrumental in this process,
since it can be used to clarify ambiguities that may present themselves
in agreements or rules, and can provide a more detailed account of
the intentions and expectations of the relevant parties. As Larry
Solan points out in his article on "pernicious ambiguity," language
and the law have several common interests. 3 While linguistic scholars
work toward revealing the rules and laws that govern the structure of
particular languages, legal scholars are exposed to the intricacies of
written and oral communication by the very nature of their field.
Solan discusses the significance of language that can have more than
one meaning and how such issues have been handled by courts.
The response of American lawyers to the problem of ambiguous
language has been to adopt a verbose and complicated version of the
English language, or "legalese." The field of law has thus appropriately earned the nickname, "the profession of words," not only
because of the field's use of verbose English, but also because of the
complex grammatical structures used in legal documents to ensure
precision.
Christopher King and Claire Hill suggest that the "legalese"
adopted by the American legal system needlessly causes contracts to
be long, confusing, and labor intensive to draft, but that are only
minimally better (if at all) than their German counterparts.4 Hill and
King use the linguistic differences between German and English contracts to illustrate the role of words in two very different legal cultures. By first identifying the disparities in language that are evident
between English and German contracts-such as sentence length and
complexity, word choice, redundancy, and structure-Hill and King
identify the reasons for these disparities and evaluate how these are
justified. By analyzing the contrasting legal language, Hill and King

3. Lawrence M. Solan, PerniciousAmbiguit , in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 859 (2004).
4. Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German ContractsDo as Much with Fewer
Words?, 79 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 889 (2004).

CHICAGO-KENT LA IV REVIEW

tVol 79:849

are ultimately able to determine whether one contract law regime can
be considered superior to the other.
The significance of language is also evident in Peter Tiersma's
article, Did Clinton Lie?: Defining "Sexual Relations."5 Tiersma uses
former President Clinton's deposition as an example of how the law
uses language in a highly technical and specialized manner. When
asked if he engaged in "sexual relations" with Monica Lewinsky, as
the term was defined by Paula Jones's lawyers, Tiersma suggests that
Clinton responded truthfully. Despite painstaking attempts by Jones's
lawyers to explicitly characterize all acts considered sexual through
detailed definitions, Clinton was able to exploit the ambiguity of a
single, seemingly innocuous term through the use of clever linguistic
skills. The minute linguistic technicality Clinton cleverly exploited
further demonstrates how linguistic techniques can affect legal outcomes.
Language can indeed expose a myriad of complexities that often
expose various components of the law. In addition to the troubles it
can present within the English language, as many of the previously
discussed articles indicate, David J. Gerber, in his article Authority
Heuristics, explores the ways in which language is instrumental in
many of the misconceptions that arise when American legal scholars
attempt to understand foreign law systems. 6 He suggests that specific
strategies are necessary to overcome the inverse relationship between
highly esteemed authoritative sources on particular foreign legal subjects and the accuracy of the information such sources convey, because "outsiders" (those who are not members of a foreign legal
culture) often develop misconceptions of these foreign law systems as
a result of numerous linguistic discrepancies between their culture
and those another. The elements of authoritative legal texts that
make up the content of legal texts that are of value to "insiders"
(those who are members of the foreign legal system), Gerber argues,
are precisely the same characteristics that tend to mislead outsiders
seeking knowledge of a foreign system.
Since language itself also influences the actions of legal decisionmakers, the operational meaning of legal texts is not only useful for
predicting legal outcomes, but is also necessary for accurately assessing legal situations. Mere translation of legal texts is obviously not
5. Peter Tiersma, Did Clinton Lie?: Defining "Sexual Relations", 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
927 (2004).
6. David J. Gerber, Authority Heuristics,79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959 (2004).
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sufficient for understanding the application and practice of foreign
laws, but Gerber demonstrates how a mistaken dependence on conflicting authority heuristics can prove even more detrimental to actually discerning a text's complete operational meaning. Gerber
suggests that "authoritative templates" be created specifically as a
reference tool for outsiders that would outline the operational meanings within certain legal texts, thus minimizing the misperceptions
outsiders may develop when researching foreign legal texts on their
own. The obstacles presented by language discrepancies would be
thwarted by cost-effective documents that could summarily point out
many significant facets of a foreign legal system that might otherwise
be overlooked or misunderstood.
Language may be necessary for effective and efficient communication and to clarify parties' intent and purpose, but, as a couple of
the articles mentioned above imply, it also has the potential to complicate legal processes. Its advanced and field-specific application
within the American legal system, in particular, has created a culture
where labor-intensive preparation and/or analysis is required for even
the most mundane legal tasks. Despite the clarifications, elaborations,
and specifications facilitated by language utilized in a legal context,
the incorporation of some linguistic applications also arguably contribute to the inefficiency and complexity of some sectors of the law.
Even so, an interdisciplinary examination of the two enhances the
public debate over whether changes to the current system are necessary.
It is often quite difficult, however, to determine the ideal response to subjective social dilemmas such as those that arise from
linguistic manipulation of legal communications. Quantifiable evidence, conversely, can potentially offer a more objective examination
of the problem at hand. For example, Matthew Adler's paper on the
pricing of fear in regulatory regimes utilizes a cost-benefit calculation
to develop a mathematical model on how fear motivates and impacts
behavior. 7 By providing quantitative evidence, Adler relies on psychology to present his case for assigning a monetary value to occupational, environmental, or consumer hazards in order to realize the
most appropriate regulatory approach.

7. Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricingof Fear and
Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977 (2004).
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Erin O'Hara also examines a part of the law with psychological
connections.8 Rather than apply a cost-benefit analysis to current
criminal justice procedures to determine the most efficient solution,
she utilizes research that looks at the impact of the current system on
both victims and perpetrators, from battered wives to negligent
healthcare workers. Her article discusses many of the psychological
factors that play a role in criminal sentencing, from the healing of the
victim to the remorse of the perpetrator. She then goes on to suggest
an alternative use for apologies in sentencing. Despite studies that
suggest that a victim benefits when he is able to conceptualize the
perpetrator as a human being, O'Hara points out that our judicial
system is inadequately equipped to provide victims with the opportunity to take an active role in determining the sentence for the perpetrator. Our current system takes a more collective approach and
treats criminal offenses as if they are just as much a crime against the
community as they are against the victim. While this is often more
efficient, objective, and protective of a defendant's rights, the current
system fails to incorporate the victim's personal views and may
thereby be psychologically detrimental to him.
In addressing the arguments against factoring the wishes of victims into punishments and sentences, it becomes apparent that the
psychological and legal approaches clash. While judges and lawyers
may conclude that a victim's opinion is inappropriate in the sentencing phase of a trial and only minimally beneficial to the victim and to
society, psychologists may reach the opposite conclusion. O'Hara also
analyzes empirical research on the nature and psychological impact of
apologies and forgiveness, which I found to be incredibly interesting
and surprisingly relevant. I initially considered the debate in terms of
the tension between the desires of victims and the rights of defendants. The emotional influence of a victim could bias sentencing
deliberations, and the sentences sought by a victim could be inappropriate. Still, O'Hara's discussion made me wonder how a legal system
would be able to balance the psychological benefits to victims that
flow from a sense of control and emotional vindication, with the legal
system's duty to provide a fair sentence to the defendant based on
more objective criteria. O'Hara's proposal provides a detailed theoretical framework that addresses the current legal system's shortfalls
in helping victims, such that legal professionals consider the interests
8. Erin Ann O'Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent
Doctors Might Have in Common, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (2004).
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of society and provide an objective balance at sentencing proceedings.
In practice, however, would this additional component to the punishment phase of a case truly benefit victims if their input rarely
affected the final outcome? Could their statements affect the likelihood of a mistrial if they are particularly lenient, overly harsh, obviously biased towards the defendant, or wholly disagree with the
decision of the judge? O'Hara's article does an excellent job of including a wide range of relevant interdisciplinary scholarship and
suggests a theoretically viable solution that should withstand critiques
from several fields. The analysis may eventually improve the legal
system, but may also generate as many new issues as it hopes to solve.
Looking at another component of criminal law, Jacqueline Ross
examines the alarming trends in the value placed on police infiltration.' She examines cases where contrived offenses are used to convict
a defendant, rather than independent crimes. She suggests that this
potentially hazardous new inclination stems from reinforcing incentives that encourage law enforcement personnel to take "legal shortcuts." Contrived offenses, she argues, show what a defendant will do
given the opportunity, not what he is capable of on his own. This
approach gives infiltrators little motivation to limit their influence.
That the actual amount of harm such an offense inflicts on society is
not deemed relevant suggests that this component of our legal system
should be reevaluated.
Bruce Chapman uses game theory to suggest an economic
method for applying theories of rationality to legal interactions1 0
Rather than demonstrating how the law benefits from his interdisciplinary study, Chapman uncovers many of the inadequacies of game
theory and Nash equilibria in predicting and explaining the verbal
exchanges of rational actors.
There are many areas of psychology that can provide practical
benefits to legal professionals. Barbara Spellman suggests that many
legal skills, such as analogy, can be taught and should be looked at in
more detail by legal educators, since causal and counterfactual reasoning is relevant to the majority of civil and criminal actions." By
9. Jacqueline E. Ross, Valuing Inside Knowledge: Police Infiltration as a Problemfor the
Law of Evidence, 79 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1111 (2004).

10. Bruce Chapman, Common Knowledge, Communication, and Public Reason, 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1151 (2004).
11. Barbara A. Spellman, Reflections of a Recovering Lawyer: How Becoming a Cognitive
Psvchologist-and (In Particular) Studying Analogical and Causal Reasoning- Changed M)
Views About the Field of Psychology and Law. 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1187 (2004).
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providing concrete examples of relevant applications of psychology in
a legal context, Spellman makes the case for the usefulness of incorporating psychology into law.
John Darley and Kenworthey Bilz present another social science
approach to punishment that touches on some of the same concepts
mentioned above.' 2 Criminal law theory outlines four purposes of
criminal punishment: rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, and
retribution. Recent legal policy, however, seems to be increasingly
focused on deterrence and incapacitation. Darley and Bilz argue that
these policies are fundamentally misguided because they fail to
address the underlying social problems that contribute to crime, they
are ineffective at deterring certain subgroups of the population, they
incapacitate potentially productive members of society, they overlook
opportunities for rehabilitation and increase recidivism rates, and
they limit the ability of an offender to pay retribution. Some alternatives Darley and Bilz mention seem to be much more appropriate,
cost-effective, and collectively beneficial than the approach derived
from a purely deterrent and incapacitative policy. For example, the
"day fine" used in Finland is a fine that varies in proportion to the
defendant's income so as to provide the same deterrent effect for civil
crimes to both wealthy and poorer citizens.
More likely alternatives here in the United States involve an
element of humiliation to reinforce public disapproval and encourage
behavior modification, such as a bumper sticker declaring a personal
drinking problem for a convicted drunk driver. Offenders may also be
forced to provide some sort of retribution to the community through
volunteer work or financial compensation. Darley and Bilz promote a
system where offenders are not locked away in expensive facilities
that encourage deviant behavior, but instead where criminals are
faced with a punishment tailored to their specific criminal actions.
The social pressure from friends, relatives, and neighbors has been
shown to produce a much greater deterrent than the threat of more
traditional criminal sanctions. The community benefits from knowing
justice is being done in such an approach. In this instance, it seems
that judicial systems are hesitant to embrace these experimental punishments because they are difficult to formulate and supervise. Progressive communities, however, are starting to realize the advantages
of an approach to punishment based on social science, especially for
12. Kenworthey Bilz & John M. Darley, What's Wrong With Harmless Theories of Punishmnent, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. t215 (2004).
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non-violent offenders who pose little additional threat to society. This
alternative policy approach should be thoroughly considered by legal
systems burdened by high recidivism rates and jail over-population.
Yet another philosophical perspective on the law was provided
by Richard Warner, who suggests that we must revise our existing
commitment to the respect of persons in order to override competing
rights. 13 He discusses several scenarios where moral rights clash with
the Comparative Conception, a term he uses to describe the justification of a particular action stipulated by a comparison of conflicting
reasons to make a rational decision. Preemptive Conception, on the
other hand, is based on value-weighted judgments that ultimately
reflect on our personal and collective identities. Warner contends that
our incomplete or inconsistent values beget preemptive reasons that
are often blurry, vague, and are hard to clearly and concisely ascertain. These exceptions are often limited by individuals who collectively agree on what constitutes palliating circumstances and
therefore merits reason-preemption consideration. Rational decisions
are more subjective with this approach, and preemptive reasoning
often impels debates on the moral expostulations in question before
prevaricating a collective, preeminent solution. Warner concludes
that public policy would significantly benefit from enhanced attention
to reason-preempting commitments because of their significant role
in decision making, but also in defining our social identity.
Finally, David Luban presents a religious fable that looks at the
many ancient foundations to modern law. 14 Luban builds on a story of
the actions of a group of rabbis who refuse to deviate from the wishes
of the majority rather than do what a divine voice instructs them is
right. He unexpectedly concludes that the story, while possibly providing insight to others, does not apply universally to concepts of
authority and law. He asserts that the lessons derived from the story
are dependent on individual interpretations, but they nevertheless
provide an interesting analogy to modern law.
All of the articles in this Symposium demonstrate a wide array of
interdisciplinary approaches to modern law and incorporate research
that is dependent on knowledge gathered from other disciplines. In
doing so, these articles provide a glimpse of the difficulties that can be
13.

Richard Warner. Rights, Rationalit, and the Preemption of Reasons, 79 CHI.-KENT L.

REV. 1091 (2004).

14. David Luban, The Coiled Serpent of Argument: Reason, Authorit,, and Law in a Talmudic Tale, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (2004).
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encountered when formulating conclusions based on multiple areas of
study. By considering the unique interdisciplinary approach to law
provided by each of the Symposium's contributing scholars, we can
examine the benefits and limitations that arise from incorporating
knowledge from other disciplines into the law. While the topics covered in this Symposium -philosophy, psychology, biology, religion,
and language-illuminate many of the unique advantages of combining the analysis of legal issues with other fields, it is also important to
note that these subjects are by no means exclusive in terms of their
involvement with public policy and legal scholarship.
My brief assessments of these articles provide only a limited
account of the great range of interdisciplinary work presented in legal
contexts. Each discipline provides a unique and valuable perspective
on the study and practice of law that enhances public policy and ensures justice and order. The "Law &" Symposium not only showcases
the wide range of noteworthy benefits gleaned from the contributions
of other subjects, but also reveals the complexities of an interdisciplinary approach as well. As a student about to begin her law school
career, I am amazed at the fascinating issues brought to light by the
interdisciplinary focus of this Symposium.

